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Recently there has been considerable interest m the
issue of the liberalization of the branching laws that

currently constrain the location ofammercial banks.
The McFadden Act of 1927 allows the states to
regulate the branching of both federally and state-

chartered banks. The related issue of interstate banking has brought with it much discussion .The issues
include concern over the possible failure of existing
banks and the introduction of destructive competition brought about by new entry.’ Much debate
still exists over the associated issues of economies of
scale in banking as well as the differentialeffectsof de
IIOLY)
entry and new branching on competition.2
This paper extrapolates from differencesin mortgage rates between branching and unit banking
states to assess the likely consequences of interstate
banking on competition. A reduced-form equation
explains differentialsin mortgage rates as a function
of demand, risk, supply of funds, and market structure
variables. The results confirm the basic outcome of
competitive behavior. The greater the number of
competing lirms and tt,e lower the concentration of
deposits in a market area, the lower will be interest
rates on mortgages, ceteris parrotrs.One policy con’ For discus&n of theseissuesseeSsvageand Solomon( 1980).
* For discussionof economiesof scafe in banking se Benston
(1972b. Rhoades(1977) andHeggestad(N79) review Ihe litemtue on
competition in banking.

elusion is that at least in the mortgage market the
spread of interstate banking will, ceferis par‘ibus,
decreasecompetition if’itincreasesdeposit concentration levelsand lowers the number of competing firms.
One means of lowering mortgage rate diflerentialsis
through increased control of branching and the
reiaxation of entry restrictions of new tim=. It is also
argued that only those states under statewide branching laws may receivemore competitive environments
from the introduction of Interstate banking.

PREVIOUS RFSEARCH
The relationship between market structure and performance in financial markets has been the subject of
many studies Measures of performance have included profit rates, interest rates charged on loans,
interest rates payed on deposits, servicecharges, and
hours of operation Since the present paper uses
interest rates oc loans as the measure of performance,
this discussion is confined primarily to previous
studies that use interest rates to measure performance.
Locational differencesin demand for funds affect
differentials in interest rates. As proxies for the
demand for housing, Aspinwall(l970)and Davis and
Verbrugge (1978) use changes in the number of
households, while Kaufman (1966)uses changes in
population. Differencesin borrower risk also account
for interest rate di&rentials. Davis and Verbrugge
(1978)find that the ratios of the installment-to- aud
construction-to-total mortgage losns afiectrates positively.Longbrake and Peterson (1979)find that past
Izises raise interest rates.

Differencesin market strurtllre also explain inlerest
rate differentials. Aspinwali (1970). Fr;;ser and Rose
(1371;. and Lonpbrake and Peterson(1979) find both
the number of firms and concentration ratios affecting
interest rates in the predicted direction. Edwards
(1964. Rhoades(l9i7). and Longbrake and Peterson
( 1979:find no :.ignificantrelationship betwtin interest
rates and branching I,iws. Relatively lower rates of
mobility and turnov-r for the three largest banks in
unit binking states is found in IHeggestad and
Rhoadej ( 1976).
One problem in all these studies, that market
structure is defined b} only one type oflender, is most
‘-;‘rlouswhen more than one type of firm serves the
market. as is the case for mortgages. Flechsig (1965)
and K&man (1966) study the effect of commercial
hank structure on bu*;iness loan rates in various
Standard Mrwopolita:.. Stawical
Areas (SMSAs).
Aspinwaii i 1970) uses a sample of commercial bank
mortgage rates in 31 SMSAs. Fraser and Rose (1971)
cott\ider acerageloan rates of commercial banks in 78
“rm;di” cities in Texas. Heggestad and Mingo (1976)
uq a sample of 236 commercltil banks in 52 SMSAs
I&;study dilTeren:iaisin new car loan rates. Davis and
Vcrbrugge (19781 stud? locational differences in
arerage mortgage loan yields of 795 savingsand loan
a\scK-latirjns.Lonpbrake and Peterson(1979) use data
from YI I commercial hanks to study differences in
a\erape yields on mortgage portfolros. Rhoades
I 1979) considers a sample of 184 SMSAs to test the
ciFc!t of thrift institutions on the average yield on
t~nl. loan>.
TO control for the e&3
performance.

of nonbdnk lenders on

several studies use a dichotomous

~arwble. Heggestd and Mingo (1976) find that the
Prc=nce of savir,gs,and loan associations helps to
explain differentials in service charges on demand
dcpcGts at commercial banks. Other methods of
cuntrolhng for competing firms have also been used.
Kaufman (Is)661 found that the ratio of savings and
loan assocwtion assets to commercial bank deposits
.iffwted commercial bank loan rates in one of two

?i-ars tested. White (1976) found that the combined
number c4 savings and loan associations and commewal

hanks affected the number of commercial

hank ofliw.

Davis and Verbrugge (1978) ftnd a small

but significant effect on mortgage rates of savings and

when the deposit concentration
ratarTsand ilumber of firms inclrlde mutual savings
barrhsand commercial hanks aloilp with savings and
loan ah5mclattons.Rlhoades (1979) finds some evi-

loan aswciations

’ See Wcggc-ti

(

1474)

fora tbomlgh reviewof lhislitetature.

dence that nonbank thrifts inlluence the portfolio

decisions of commercial banks.
These studies suggest two avenues for new research.First, one should consider all competing firms
in market performance.Studiestl:tatdo not do SOmay
lead to biased results. In parl:icular, studies that
consider only one form of organization may overestimate the impact of market structure and competition on performance in markets with many
competing firms. Second, new ways of considering
competing firms will provide more information on
how “competitive” or substitutable they are in product markets. One obvious way of improving measures
of market structure is to substitute quantitative
measuresof r,onbank ccmpetition for the dichotomous measures of nonbank presence used in White
(1976). Davis and Verbrugge (1978). and Rhoades
( 1979).

DATA
Thus a study of diRerences in performance across
areas must include all the major firms. This point is
especially relevant because of the growing homogeneity of depository linancial institutions brought
about by the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980. This paper
models the mortgage market because it is a distinct
market with many competing financial institutions.
As such the likely effectsof interstate banking may be
best observed in the mortgage market,
The data employed in this paper (Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, 1979) result from a survey of all
qualifying loans in 1975 for single-family. nonfarm,
conventional mortgages closed during the first five
working days ofeach month. Respondents include all
the major mortgage ‘lenders: commercial banks.
mortgage bankers, mutual savings banks, and savings
and loan associations. The local market arca is
approximated by the SMSA. The sample consists of
62,409 loans in 111 SMSAs. The data attlpcalculatedas
annual averagesfor all reported loans (i.e., no: dnnual
averagesof monthly data).j The number OI loans for
these SMSAs range from 63 to 5,295. All loans are for
existing dwellings since the commitment lag tends to
be shorter for existing than Ir new dwellirg and
allows the terms at the closing date to reflect ,nore
accurately current mortgage market conditions. The
interest rate is an effective rate calculated

by the

’ This may pnduce biasedestimate3if thematr significantlymote
loans in one or mon months thar. the average number, But this
problemis probablynot seriousfor cross-sectional
dam.

FHLBB’s amortizing initial fees and charges over a
ten-year period.
These data allow several improvements in the
study of the relationship between market structure
and perfonnance.Oneistheuseofanelfcctiveinteres.
rate on conventiotml mortgage loans only, while most
studies use 8ver8ge km rates 8s cakulatd
by
dividing total Interest and feesby total loans per year.
As Heggestad {1979) points out, one of the obvious
loan rates is that interest
problems of using aver*
rates vary with the type, maturity. and risk characteristicsof loans, so part of the variation in loan rates
may result from differencesin the economic circumstances of SMSAs rather than Born market structuT(I.
The data employed in this paper isolate the conventional mortgage market and include all the major
mortgage lenders Since the effective interest rate in
this study is determined by the interactions of all
major lenders it should allow better estimation of the
relationship between structure and performance.
A second improvement comes from the measures
of risk. All loans are conventional. By contrast,
previous studies (Davis and Verbrugge (1978):
Longbrake and Peterson, 1979) have included FHA
and VA mortgages along with conventional mortgages,yet the risk characteristicsof conventional and
nonconventional loans may differ. Except for
Longbrake and Peterson (1979) the present study is
the first to use foreclosure rates.

AN EMPlRlCAL MODEL
The model generally used to test the structureperformancerelationship in financial markets is of the
form”
P =f(D, C. M. s, x 1

(1)

where
D=

set of variables
conditions

to

c=

set of variables to measure cost dikrences
across firms and markets

M=

measure of deposit concentration

S=

other structure variables

x=

set of control variables associatedwith product characteristics

P=

some aspect of performance, such as the
interest rate on loans.

sHeggeslsd
( 1979)reviecvs
senml

measure demand

applicationsof thisform.

AS H-tad
(1979) argues, no rigorous theoretic8l model provides the correct specticaticn of the
relationship between structure and performance or,
Con~uCntly, the appropriate functional form of the
CqU8tiort.* Equation (1) is a reduced-formequation.’
Its use here facilitates comp8risons of past research
with the present paper. Also, a linear, reduced-form
equation allows one to measure the net impacts of
independent variabks regardks
of whether the
supply or demandequations have shifted.s
Dettnutd conditions Dare measuredby population
and the percentagechange between 1974and 1975.
Both should be positively related to mortgage rates.
The local quantity of deposits C is used to measure
cost differences8cTOsS
firms and markets.The greater
the quantity of deposits, the lower interest rates
should be, certeris paribus.’ The combined total
deposits of commercial banks, mutual savings banks,
and savingsard loan associationsand the percentage
change between 1974 and 1975control for cost
differences.lo
An additional element of costs is the ratio of the
number ofcommerical hank ofices to the numbers of
mutual savings banks and savings and loan associ:ltion otlices’ ’ if there are differencesbetween firms
m the sptead between borrowing and lending rates,
these difkerences may a.&ct differentials in local
interest rates. For example, diBerencesin regulation
concerning the composition of assets and in
Fegulation Q may produce differencesin returns and
t le costsof funds to variorrstypesof firms.Jfit is easier
for commercial banks to obtain charters than thrifts,
then artificial entry barriers may a&t interest rate
dikrentials. One msy expect that a higher ratio,
-

crrreris p&us, leads to higher mortgage rates because mutuai savings banks and savings and loan
associationsmust invest a higher proportion of their
assets in conventional mortgagesthan do commercial
banks.
Several
control variables relate to the product
itself: loan-to-value, term-to-maturity, and foreclosure rate variablesi In this study there is a single
produrZ of heterogeneousquality: conventional mortgages. The greater the risk characteristics of borrowers,cetetis @bus, the higher the interest rates,to
compensatelenders for higher probabilities of default
or delinquency. The signs on both the loan-to-value
and foreclosurevariables should be positive, whi!e the
signcurthe term-to-maturity variable is ambiguous.A
longer term lead:; to lower monthly payments and
consequently to a !ower probability of default; hence
term-to-maturity might take a negative sign. But a
longer term implies a slo~r paydown; hence term-tomaturity might also take a positive sign (rellecting
higher risk for longer terms.l’3 Since there is no u
pric)ri reasoning to choose one explanation over the
other, the expected sign is ambiguous.‘*
Market structure variables M and S define the
environment within which fi,,nt compete. This paper
delines market structure as the environment within
which commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and
savings and loan associations compete. Mortgage
bankers are excluded since there is no data by SMSA
on the location, number. or size of mortgage bankers.” Numbers of the three types of firms are one
measure of market structure. Two quantitative
measuresof the numbers of institutions are used:the
number affirms and the total number of ofllces(which
includesall bi arches). if the branchesof a firm do not
compete with each other, the specification of thi,
variable is important. Competition may best be
measuredas the number oflirms not the total number
of olfices. since br,anchesmay represc.rt more of u
convenience to customers than as ‘competing lirms.
Deposit concentration ratios for commercial banks
are also used to measurethe effectof market structure
on interest rates. Ratios for commercial banks are

used. since a three- or live-firm concentration ratio
will general11include only commercial banks because
they are typtwlly the largest depository financial
institutions in any SMSA.i6
A dummy variable for unit banking is included to
test whether unit banking laws increase competition
through lower deposit concentration than do statcwide and limited branching laws.”
The measure of performance P is the efhxtive
interest rate on conventional mortgage loans.
List of Independent

Variables

POP

= population in 1975

P7574

= percentage change in population
between 1974 and 1975

DEP

= total deposits at commercial
banks, mutual savings banks and
savings and loan associations in
1975

07574

= percentage change in total deposits between 1974 and 1975

FOR

= foreclosure rate in 1975

LI’

= loan-to-value ratio in 1975

TM

= term to maturity in 1975

FIRM

= number of cvlmmercial banks.
mutual savings banks, end savings
and ioan associations in 1975

OFFICES

= number of offices of commercial
banks, mutual savings banks, :I, ._
savings and loan assoc:p*: ‘, in
1975 (includes bran&f

co3

= three-firm deposit concentration
ratio in 1975

cm

= five-firm deposit concentratinn
ratio in 1975

L’B

= unit banking dummy (UB= 1 if
othcrunit bank state. UB=O
wise)

RCS

= number of commercial bank offices divided by the numbers 01
mutual savings bank and savings

” ti

fmm
forrcloQurr
rateisobtained

ud is C&dated
lmurcd

for Federal Savings and Loan lnstnanrc Corporation-

savi@sandtoanassuciaiions
by ShiSA

LoanBankBoanl(1979).

I6 Davis and Vedxugge ( 1979) calculate concentnuion ratios for
all types of institutions and fti

( 19811
argue+
h

in

in 1975. Loan-to.

value mlios and tcrm~ of ma&nily are obtained fmm Federal Home
u Meador

and loan association ofices
1975.

unpublished FHl PB tiles

default risk attaches to market value

that these variables do nol explain much

of the differentials in interest rates. Deposit ratios atx from Summary

undDeposirs

of

of house, nol to borrower iacome. In effect, rhe botmwer has a put

Arcounrs

oP=n.
” ti

and Yezcr (1979) for .s discussion of this

represent the state branching environment for all institutions. II is

limit the ~sults of the study since mortgage

also treat mutual savings banks and savings and loan assuciations in a

(1974.1975).

” It can be argued that state branching laws for commercial banks
Banh. Co&x.

polfll

likely that states with liberal commercial bank branching laws would

‘* This shouldtd

baokemarenotnetkndcrs.

similar manner.

TABLE 1. Regression Results Using Effective Interest Rate as Dependent VariabIe
---

Independent

Variable

(1)

(2)

lntorcapt

a.21=
(22.00)
0.0001~
(1.35)
1.49
(1.16)
-0.00001
(-1.03)
1.68C
(3.00)
0.45’
(1.40)
o.ol*
w6)
-0.006
(-0.56)
-0.0009*
(-2.17)

8.16C
(21.31)
-0.0004
( -0.66)
1.62
(1.23)
-0.00001
(-0.68)
1.49c
(2.64)
0.37
(1.14)

POP
P7574
DEP
07574
FOR
LV
TM
FIRM
OFFICES

o.ol*
mo)
-0.004

(-0.37)

(3)
(2:::;
-0.0001
(0.38)
1.670
(1.30)
-0.00001
(-0.74)
I .75c
(3.11)
0.38
(1.20)
o.ol*
(2.07)
-0.008
(-0.76)

Equation
(4)
7.99
(21.03)
-0.0001
(0.49)
1.61
(1.26)
-0.0000I
(-0.85)
1.79c
(3.17)
0.42u
(1.33)
O.o)*
(2.12)
-0.0008
(-0.77)

(5)
7.85C
(18.89)
0.00008
(0.29)
1.12
(0.88)
- 1,.0000 1
(-0.66)
1.78C
(3.23)
0.470
(1.49)
0.02c
(2.76)
-0.0006
(-0.58)

8.17c
(21.87)
0.0001
(0.24)
1.36
(1.05)
-0.00001
(-0.G3)
1.94c
(3.25)
0.48’
(1.47)
0.01=
(1.48)
0.0004
(0.04)

0.0002
(0.79)

co3

0.003c
(2.38)

CO5

0.003c
(2.44)

L’B

-0.17c
(2.92)

RCS
0.2827

R2

(6)

0.2543

0.2892

0.2911

0.3076

0.036
(2.07)
0.2798

e Signifkance at 90 percent level.
* Sfni~cancs at 95 percent IOVSI.
c Slgnlflcance at 99 percent level.

RESULTS
The six cross-sectional regressions appear in Table
I.‘” Including each structure variable in a separate
regression avoids the problem of multicollinearity.
For example, the branching variable UB is clearly
relatedto the concentrationand number of institutlons variables. Savage and Solomon (1980) find
that states with unit banking laws have lower deposit
concentration ratios than do states that allow some
form of branching. The population variables POP
and P7574 are generally insigr&ant. Where sign6
cant. their positive sign suggests that they exert
upward pressure on interest rP.tes.”

The coefficient on the total deposit variable DEP is
always negative but never significantly d&rent from
zero. The percentage change in deposits variable
07574 is uniformly positive and significant.” This
suggests that, with all else remaqning the same. the
greater the percentage change in deposits in an area,
the higher interest rates tend to be. Whrle this result is
unexpected, it may indicate that this variable is a
proxy for growth of the effective demand for housing.
The borrower risk variables FOR and ~3’ both
exert positive impacts on interest rates and are
generally significant. The signs on the term-tomaturity variable are generally negative and are never
signilicant. By contrast, Longbrake and Peterson

Is IRc use of deposits and populatiivlseparatelyis cquivalenlto

using their ~Sos. except that the res!xctive coet.icients arc unconsuaind.
‘s Sidar w.uhs for these variablesARfound in Kaufman(I %6)
andLongbmkead Merson (1979).

m llle percentage cluulge beween 1973 and 1975 for tN&
popularionand deposits were also used. These variahk were new
signif~anr. implyingthatmarketsrcpclralherquickly.

(1979) found no signscant

relationship between
foreclosure rates and interest rates.
Thf -umber of firms FIRM has a negative and
sign&ant impact on interest rates, implying that an
increase of ten firms would reduce interest rates by
nine basis points. The total number of oflices
OFFICES, by contrast, does not exert a significant
impact on interest rates. These results confirm the
notion that areas with many firms, ceteris paribus,
have lower interest rates, whilethe number ofofficesis
not a significantdeterminant. Hence increased branching does dot reduce interest rates.
The three- and five-firmconcentration ratios CO3
and C05, respe&ely, exerted positive and significant
impacts on interest rates. It is interesting to compare
the sizlesofcoefficients on the concentration variables
with those found in other studies. Edwards (1972)
compares the work of three studies that iind concentration\ variables to be significant and virtually the
same at 0.006. The magnitude of the concentration
variable in this study is 0.003 (suggesting that a 10
percent increase in coccentration will increase loan
rates by three basis points). The reason for the size
diflerenlw:may be because the other studies consider
only cosrlmercial banks, overestimating the effects of
concentration on loan rates in markets with several
types of competing tirms. Studies using average loan
rates may attribute rate differences due to the nonuniform and multiproduct compositions of loan
portfolios to concentration.
The coel?icient on the unit banking variable UB is
negative and significantly different from zero, suggesting that states with limi!ed and statewide branching
laws offer higher interest rates, cereris paribus. than do
states l+th unit banking laws. This result also
suppo:ts the finding above that areas with a relatively
large number of firms FIRM offer relatively low

interest rates. This connection between the eflectsof
UBand FIRM variablesresults because unit banking
states have more firms than do states with limited or
statewide branching laws.
The ratio of commercial bank offires to mutual
savings banks and savings and loan association
ollices RCS has a posiuve and significant impact on
Interest rates. The size of the coefficient indicates, for
example. that a 10 percent increase in this ratio would
increase interest rates by 30 basis points, suggesting
that differences produced by differing local proportions of the various types offirms atfect mortgage rate
differentials. This is expected since the higher the

number of commercial banks relative to the numbers
of mutual savings banks and savings and loan
associations. the weaker is the relative commitment of
the firms lo the mortgage market. This variable serves

as a proxy for d&ing differeaca in the characteristics of the firms competing in this market and
reinforces the notion that the modeling of all types of
firms in the market is essential to an understanding of
differentials in interest rates.
The coefficientsof determination Rzs range from
0.2543 to 0.3076, comparedwith approximately0.15

for this type of study, as discussed in Hcggestad
(1979).This improvement results from the use of an
effective interest rate for a welldelinad product
market. Most of the previous studies did not control
for nonbank thrifts, risk measures for a wellddined
market, and differences produced by varying the
proportions of banks and nonbank thrifts.
CONCLUSION
The tests in this paper suggest that greater competition among firms in an area lowers mortgage
interest rates. The meas!:res of competition that
helped explain interest rate differentials are the
number of firms, deposit concentration ratios, and
branching laws. The ratlc of commercial banks to
mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations had a significantand positive e&t on interest
rates. States with unit banking laws have lower
interest rates than states that allow branching. Since
states with unit banking laws have more firms and
lower concentration ratios than do states with limited
and statewide branching, it seems reasonable to point
to branching laws as the key to determining the
relative degree of competition in an area. One policy
implication of this result is that one means oireducing
mortgage rates is increased control of branching and
the relaxation of entry restrictions of new firms. One
limitation of this study is the extent to which one may
make policy conclusionsfor all finanacialmarkets. An
implication of this study is that there is no national
market for mortgages. While this allowsone to extend
policy suggestions for households and small firms.
national markets may exist for relatively large firms.
For example, large firms may already borrow or! the
national market and not be subject to the policy
conclusions drawn from this study. It is important to
recognizediflerencesin product markets when studying the probable effects of change in regulation.
This study also has implications for some recent
developmen,;sin the finanacial sector. The increase in
bank mergers, bank and nonbank acquisitions by
bank-holding companies, and the activitiesof foreign
banks in the United States have altered the structure
of the banking industry.2’ In one sense these develop
*I For a discussionof theseissuessee Rhoadcts
(1960).

mentsare a libemlization of the restrictions on
interstate banking in the McFadden Act, but the
potential edkts on market concentration. numbers of
fhs
aad branches and market shares of d&rent
types of firms of mergers, bank-holding companies,
and foreign banking need to be anal@. For
exam* this study suggeststhat the relative proportionsddifferenttypesof~nnsinamarketwillaffect
the local mortgage rate. Researchon the degree of
substitutability betweenthe traditional forms oflirms

and holding companies is needed to define the
appropriate market. Once the market is defii
researc!~similar to the present study may provide
insights about the competitive elfects of interstate
banking on competition.
This study suggests that an increase in interstate
banking will produce increased concentration and
decrease competition among fial
inter;tiiaries.
Savage and Solomon (1960) expect that interstate
banking will increase the number of commercial
banks and decrease deposit concentration ratios in
states with statewide branching laws. In other states,
they expect interstate banking to decreasethe number
of commercial banks and increase concentration
ratios l-he present paper suggests an interesting
policy implication, given that these predictions are
accurate. If relaxation of the McFadden Act promotes dr NW entry, then states that previously allowed
statewide branching may witness an increase in
competition. On the other hand, states previously
under unit banking laws would have lesscompetition
owing to a decline in the number of firms. This study
suggests that the new branches in formerly unit
banking states will not increase competition in them.
One major concern is that while all local markets may
be made more competitive through the reduction of
restrictions on & PKWY)
entry, it may be that only those
states formerly under statewidebranchinglaws will
receive more competitive environments from the
introductionof interstatebanking. Obviouslymore
research on the expected outcome de nouo entry and
branching from the relaxation of the McFadden Act
is necessary to assess the desirability of interstate
banking.
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